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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS 
In the spring of 2006, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
passed and implemented An Act Providing Access to Affordable, 
Quality, Accountable Health Care, Chapter 58 of the Acts of 2006 
(“Chapter 58”), thereby becoming the first State in the Nation 
to enact healthcare reform that requires all non-exempt 
individuals to purchase some form of health insurance coverage.  
Chapter 58’s core features include, among other things, a state-
operated health insurance exchange, new subsidies for low- and 
moderate-income individuals, and a mandate that all individuals 
who can afford health insurance purchase coverage.  Chapter 58 
has been widely cited as a model used by Congress in fashioning 
what became the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the 
“ACA”).  With four years of empirical data collected since 
Chapter 58 went into effect, Massachusetts is uniquely situated 
to speak to the actual economic effects of comprehensive reform 
that includes an individual coverage requirement. 
The experience of Massachusetts under Chapter 58 confirms a 
key Congressional assumption underlying the ACA:  that by 
requiring individuals to be insured, and thereby preventing 
healthy people from foregoing health insurance until they are 
sick or injured (a practice commonly derided as “free-riding”), 
a comprehensive reform program can spread risk, control costs, 
and reduce the financial burdens otherwise borne by health plans 
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and free-care pools.  Massachusetts submits this amicus brief in 
support of the ACA because its experience demonstrates that 
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that free-riding by 
individuals, taken in aggregate, has a substantial effect upon 
interstate commerce, and that reducing or eliminating free-
riding has a salutary impact on the health insurance market as a 
whole. 
   In July of 2005, then Governor Mitt Romney filed House Bill 
4279, and in his filing letter to the Massachusetts Legislature 
he stated:   
Today, we spend approximately $1 billion on the 
medical cost for the uninsured.  Safety Net Care 
redirects this spending to achieve better health 
outcomes in a more cost-effective manner.  With Safety 
Net Care in place, it is fair to ask all residents to 
purchase health insurance or have the means to pay for 
their own care.  This personal responsibility 
principle means that individuals should not expect 
society to pay for their medical costs if they forego 
affordable health insurance options.1 
Governor Romney’s proposed legislation to enact “Safety Net 
Care” was the precursor to Chapter 58, which he signed on April 
12, 2006.2 
                                                 
1 Letter from Governor Mitt Romney to the Massachusetts 
Legislature dated July 20, 2005, filing proposed health reform 
entitled, An Act to Increase the Availability and Affordability 
of Private Health Insurance To Residents of the Commonwealth.  
H.B. 4279, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005) 
 
2 Under Governor Romney’s proposed legislation, “Safety Net Care” 
was the term used for a proposed government subsidized premium 
 (footnote continued) 
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The Massachusetts healthcare reform law has yielded 
positive economic consequences.  Three years after its 
enactment, Massachusetts had reduced the number of uninsured 
residents to less than three percent of the state’s population 
and increased the number of residents with health insurance by 
more than 432,000, giving Massachusetts the lowest percentage of 
uninsured residents in the Nation.3  By the fall of 2009, more 
than 95 percent of nonelderly Massachusetts adults were insured, 
up from 87.5 percent in the fall of 2006.4  The significant gains 
in the number of Massachusetts residents with health insurance 
helped spur a corresponding sharp decline in the amount of state 
spending on "free care" for the uninsured and under-insured.  
                                                 
(footnote continued) 
assistance offered to low-income individuals who were not 
eligible for Medicaid.  H.B. 4279, 184th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2005). 
 
3 See Mass. Taxpayers Found., Massachusetts Health Reform: The 
Myth of Uncontrolled Costs 2 (May 2009), available at 
http://www.masstaxpayers.org/sites/masstaxpayers.org/files/Healt
h%20care-NT.pdf [hereinafter Mass. Taxpayers Found.]. 
 
4 See Blue Cross Blue Shield Found., Health Reform in 
Massachusetts: An Update as of Fall 2009 iv (June 2010), 
available at 
http://bluecrossfoundation.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Policy
%20Publications/060810MHRS2009FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BCBS Found. 
Report].  Indeed, insurance coverage rose by 14.1 percentage 
points for lower-income adults and 6.6 percentage points for 
adults with a chronic health condition between fall 2006 and 
fall 2009.  Id. at v. 
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The amount of free care dropped from $709.5 million in fiscal 
year 2006 to $414 million in fiscal year 2009.5   
Despite these successes under Chapter 58, however, 
Massachusetts, like any individual state, is unable to grapple 
effectively with the interstate (and international) economic 
implications of current healthcare trends.  While Massachusetts 
plays the primary role in protecting the health and welfare of 
Massachusetts residents, the state shares responsibility for 
regulating healthcare and health insurance with the federal 
government.  Through Medicare, Medicaid, and a variety of 
federal statutes, notably the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the federal government plays a 
substantial (and, in some areas, exclusive) role in shaping the 
nationwide healthcare marketplace.  Given this overlay, some 
aspects of healthcare reform are beyond individual states’ 
regulatory reach.  For example, Massachusetts’s ability to 
regulate the private group health plan market in Massachusetts 
is constrained by ERISA, which preempts state governments from 
enacting laws that regulate self-insured employer health benefit 
plans, the most common source of health coverage for American 
workers.   
                                                 
5 See Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, 2009 Annual 
Report: Health Safety Net 4 (Dec. 2009); Division of Health Care 
Finance and Policy, Uncompensated Care Pool PFY06 Annual Report 
3 (July 2007). 
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Accordingly, Massachusetts supports the ACA as an 
appropriate federal response to the urgent need for 
comprehensive, national healthcare reform.  The ACA carefully 
balances federal economic interests with the states’ interest in 
developing new ways to control costs while improving access to 
quality healthcare.  
ARGUMENT 
A. THE EXPERIENCE OF MASSACHUSETTS CONFIRMS THAT CONGRESS 
HAD A RATIONAL BASIS TO DETERMINE THAT FREE-RIDING, 
TAKEN IN AGGREGATE, SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECTS INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE; ACCORDINGLY, CONGRESS HAD AUTHORITY UNDER 
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE TO IMPOSE THE MINIMUM COVERAGE 
REQUIREMENT. 
The Commerce Clause provided Congress with authority to 
enact the ACA, including the minimum coverage requirement.  The 
Constitution gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
. . . among the several States.”  U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 
3.  Under this authority, Congress can “regulate activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”6  Gonzales v. Raich, 
545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).   
As “stressed” by the Supreme Court, “[i]n assessing the 
scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause . . . the 
task before [the Court] is a modest one.”  Id. at 22.  The Court 
                                                 
6 Congress also has the authority to “regulate the channels of 
interstate commerce” and to “regulate and protect the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things 
in interstate commerce.”  Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 16-17. 
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“need not determine” itself whether the regulated “activities, 
taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce 
in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so 
concluding.”  Id.   
There is a rational basis for concluding that, taken in the 
aggregate, individuals’ refusal to obtain health insurance 
substantially affects interstate commerce.  “[T]he business of 
insurance” is within “the regulatory power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause.”  United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944).  In the ACA, Congress found 
that:  
The cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured 
was $43,000,000,000 in 2008.  To pay for this cost, health 
care providers pass on the cost to private insurers, which 
pass on the cost to families. This cost-shifting increases 
family premiums by on average over $1,000 a year.  By 
significantly reducing the number of the uninsured, the 
requirement, together with the other provisions of this 
Act, will lower health insurance premiums. 
 
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended by § 10106.7  “It is well 
established by decisions of [the Supreme] Court that the power 
to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices 
at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices 
affecting such prices.”  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 
                                                 
7 Such Congressional findings are to be considered in the 
analysis when available, although they are not necessary to 
sustain the exercise of Commerce Clause authority.  Gonzales, 
545 U.S. at 21. 
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(1942) (upholding, as a proper subject of Congressional action 
under the Commerce Clause, a regulation penalizing production of 
wheat in excess of federal quota, even where applied to wheat 
grown not for market, but for consumption at home).  Because it 
directly impacts the prices at which health insurance policies 
will be sold, individuals’ refusal to obtain health insurance is 
a practice properly subject to regulation by Congress under the 
Commerce Clause.8  
The experience in Massachusetts elevates the connection 
between eliminating free-riders and controlling costs from a 
rational belief to a demonstrable correlation.  Governor Romney 
and the Massachusetts Legislature, like Congress, determined 
that an individual health insurance mandate, as part of a 
comprehensive reform package, would serve to increase access to 
healthcare while greatly decreasing the detrimental cost-
shifting caused by people who chose to forego insurance and 
shift the cost of their current and future healthcare to others.9  
As discussed above, in the three years after Chapter 58’s 
                                                 
8 As in Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 25-26, the earlier Supreme Court 
decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), are 
distinguishable as they relate to non-economic behavior. 
 
9 Federal law, in fact, requires Medicare-participating hospitals 
with an emergency department to provide emergency services to 
stabilize patients with emergency medical conditions regardless 
of whether they are insured.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
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enactment, there was, indeed, a significant increase in the 
percentage of insured Massachusetts residents.10  The significant 
gains in the number of Massachusetts residents with health 
insurance helped spur a corresponding sharp decline in the 
amount of spending on "free care" for the uninsured and under-
insured:  The amount of free care dropped 40 percent -- hundreds 
of millions of dollars -- from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 
2009.11   
 The Massachusetts reform program also has improved 
healthcare use.  From the fall of 2006 to the fall of 2009, more 
adults (including lower-income adults, adults with chronic 
health conditions and minority adults) reported visits to 
doctors and fewer adults reported unmet need for care.12 
  Massachusetts achieved these gains in access to care while 
making gains in the affordability of care for its residents.  In 
the fall of 2009, as compared with the fall of 2006, and 
notwithstanding the systemic impacts of the economic recession, 
there were reductions in both the share of adults reporting high 
                                                 
10 See Mass. Taxpayers Found., supra note 3; BCBS Found. Report, 
supra note 4, at 10. 
 
11 See Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, 2009 Annual 
Report: Health Safety Net 4 (Dec. 2009); Division of Health Care 
Finance and Policy, Uncompensated Care Pool PFY06 Annual Report 
3 (July 2007). 
 
12 BCBS Found. Report, supra note 4, at 10. 
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out-of-pocket healthcare spending relative to family income and 
the share of adults reporting unmet needs for care due to cost.13  
Moreover, nearly 200,000 of the state’s newly insured residents 
were enrolled in private plans that do not receive government 
subsidies, evidence that the more generous public programs 
created under Chapter 58 are not supplanting the state’s 
existing health insurance providers.14  Analysis from 2009 also 
demonstrates that the state’s individual health insurance 
requirement is encouraging people who were previously eligible 
for employer-based insurance, but did not previously accept it, 
to enroll in a private plan.15 
 As the experience with healthcare reform in Massachusetts 
shows, prohibiting people from opting out of the insurance 
market when they can afford coverage, and creating incentives 
for these “free-riders” to join their employer-sponsored health 
plan or to enroll in a publicly supported healthcare plan, has 
helped generate “increases in both public and private insurance 
                                                 
13 BCBS Found. Report, supra note 4, at 10. 
 
14 See Josh Goodman, Massachusetts: A Model, or Cautionary Tale?, 
Wash. Health Pol’y Wk. in Rev. (The Commonwealth Fund), June 8, 
2009, available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Newsletters/Washington-
Health-Policy-in-Review/2009/Jun/June-8-2009/Massachusetts-A-
Model-or-Cautionary-Tale.aspx. 
 
15 Id. 
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coverage, and this increase in coverage has translated into 
increases in the access, use, affordability, and quality of care 
in the state.”16    
B. BECAUSE ELIMINATING FREE-RIDERS IS, AT A MINIMUM, 
RATIONALLY RELATED TO SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
OTHER COMPONENTS OF FEDERAL HEALTHCARE LAW, CONGRESS 
ALSO HAD AUTHORITY UNDER THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE TO IMPOSE THE MINIMUM COVERAGE REQUIREMENT. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause provided Congress with 
additional authority to set the minimum coverage requirement as 
a means to effectuate the broader ends of the ACA.  The 
Constitution gives Congress the power to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper in carrying into Execution” its 
powers, including those under the Commerce Clause.  U.S. Const., 
art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
As with the analysis under the Commerce Clause, the 
standard for determining whether legislation is authorized under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause is a relaxed one.  Enactment of 
a particular federal law is authorized by the Necessary and 
Proper Clause when “the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power.”  United States v. Comstock, ___ U.S. ___, 130 
S.Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).  In Comstock, the Court reiterated its 
nearly 200-year-old formulation on this issue, originally 
                                                 
16 BCBS Found. Report, supra note 4, at 50. 
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expressed by Chief Justice Marshall, that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is a “broad power to enact laws that are 
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the . . . ‘beneficial 
exercise’” of specifically granted powers.  130 S.Ct. at 1956 
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 413, 418 (1819)). 
Thus, even if Congress lacked authority under the Commerce 
Clause to impose the minimum coverage requirement -– which it 
did not; see Argument A, supra –- it was authorized by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to impose it as a rational requisite 
of implementing other components of federal law that were 
unequivocally permitted by the Commerce Clause.  Congress made 
particular findings that make clear the rational relationship 
between the minimum coverage requirement and Congress’s exercise 
of its Commerce Clause powers in other related legislation.  
First, Congress found that: 
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and [the ACA], the Federal Government 
has a significant role in regulating health insurance.  The 
requirement is an essential part of this larger regulation 
of economic activity, and the absence of the requirement 
would undercut Federal regulation of the health insurance 
market. 
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(H), as amended by § 10106.  
 Second, Congress, in § 1201 of the ACA, makes changes to 
the Public Health Service Act that ban pre-existing condition 
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exclusions and discrimination in health insurance based on 
health status.  Congress found that: 
Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service 
Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there were 
no requirement, many individuals would wait to purchase 
health insurance until they needed care.  By significantly 
increasing health insurance coverage, the [minimum 
coverage] requirement, together with the other provisions 
of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and 
broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy 
individuals, which will lower health insurance premiums.  
The requirement is essential to creating effective health 
insurance markets in which improved health insurance 
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude 
coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold. 
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106.  
Massachusetts’s experience gives additional support to the 
conclusion that the minimum coverage requirement was, at a 
minimum, rationally related to the implementation of Congress’s 
unquestioned authority under the Commerce Clause to alter other 
aspects of the federal healthcare regulatory landscape.  
Specifically, as discussed above, Massachusetts utilized just 
such a provision as a linchpin of its comprehensive reform and 
has reaped intrastate benefits through sharp reductions in 
spending on “free care” for uninsured residents and improved 
access to healthcare. 
There remains a limit, however, to the structural changes 
Massachusetts can effect in the healthcare marketplace, given 
the constraints resulting from state jurisdictional limits and 
imposed by long-established federal law.  Healthcare access and 
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affordability significantly affect interstate activity, 
including where people choose to reside and how they obtain 
coverage and treatment.  During fiscal year 2009 alone, for 
example, Massachusetts hospitals provided inpatient care to more 
than 43,000 patients who were not residents of Massachusetts, at 
an estimated cost of $910,000,000.17  Of these non-Massachusetts 
residents, approximately 1,200 did not have any health 
insurance.18  The number of out-of-state patients without 
insurance coverage was even greater at Massachusetts emergency 
departments where more than 12,900 uninsured individuals 
received care during fiscal year 2009.19  Massachusetts cannot 
regulate insurance coverage for non-Massachusetts residents, nor 
can it (or should it) restrict access to necessary and emergent 
care.  This interstate flow of patients (including uninsured 
patients) is but one illustration that individual states cannot 
effectively account for, let alone mitigate, the impact of 
healthcare trends felt on the national and interstate levels. 
Congress has long recognized that employer health plans had 
“operational scope and economic impact” that was “increasingly 
                                                 
17 Division of Health Care Finance and Policy, Hospital Discharge 
Database (HDD) for fiscal year 2009 (October 1, 2008 through 
September 30, 2009).   
  
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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interstate.”20  The federal government already exercises 
significant control over a large section of the private group 
health plan market.  In Massachusetts, more than half of this 
market is made up of self-insured plans that, because of ERISA’s 
preemptive effect, are beyond the direct reach of state 
regulators.21  Nationwide, the number of people enrolled in these 
self-insured employer plans has increased markedly since 1999.  
In 2007, 55 percent of the 132.8 million people in plans 
governed by ERISA were in self-insured plans, up from 44 percent 
in 1999.22  The federal government has long exercised exclusive 
regulatory authority over these self-insured employer benefit 
plans.  The continued growth of self-insured plans, coupled with 
the interstate nature of the healthcare marketplace, 
demonstrates the need for the federal reforms contained in the 
ACA to establish minimum national standards for health coverage.  
The ACA specifically provides that individual states remain free 
                                                 
20 ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 2. 
 
21 The “private group market” includes large group, small group, 
and self insured members.  See Division of Health Care Finance 
and Policy, Health Care in Massachusetts: Key Indicators, 4, 6 
(Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/Eeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/10/key_indicators_
november_2010.pdf. 
 
22 See William Pierron & Paul Fronstin, ERISA Pre-emption: 
Implications for Health Reform and Coverage 314 EBRI Issue Brief 
11 (Feb. 2008), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_02a-20082.pdf.  
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to further regulate intrastate aspects of the health insurance 
market, including reforms similar to those implemented in 
Massachusetts under Chapter 58, if they so choose. 
The success of Massachusetts healthcare reform demonstrates 
the economic benefits of tackling the free-rider problem head-
on, through comprehensive reform including a requirement that 
individuals who can afford health insurance must purchase it.  
The experience of Massachusetts shows that the minimum coverage 
requirement in the ACA was, at least, rationally related to 
Congress’s effort pursuant to the Commerce Clause to address the 
interstate implications of healthcare access and affordability.  
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Massachusetts urges this Court to hold 
that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
     Respectfully submitted, 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,  
by and through its  
ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
MARTHA COAKLEY 
 
 
 
     /s/ John M. Stephan  
     Thomas M. O’Brien 
     Daniel J. Hammond 
     John M. Stephan 
     Assistant Attorneys General 
     One Ashburton Place 
     Boston, Massachusetts 02108 
     (617) 727-2200 
       
      ext. 2455 (O’Brien) 
      ext. 2078 (Hammond) 
      ext. 2959 (Stephan) 
      
 
April 8, 2011 
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